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On how AI & law can help autonomous systems obey the
law: a position paper
Henry Prakken1
Abstract. In this position paper I discuss to what extent current and
past AI & law research is relevant for research on autonomous intelli-
gent systems that exhibit legally relevant behaviour. After a brief re-
view of the history of AI & law, I will compare the problems faced by
autonomous intelligent systems with the problems faced by lawyers
in traditional legal settings. This should give insights into the extent
to which AI & law models of legal problem solving and decision
support can be applied in the design of legally well-behaving au-
tonomous systems.
1 Introduction
Increasingly, computer systems are being employed in practice with
some degree of autonomy. Their behaviour is not fully specified by
the programmer but is the result of the implementation of more gen-
eral cognitive or physical abilities. Such artificially intelligent soft-
ware can do things that, when done by humans, are regulated by law.
To give some example, self-driving cars have to obey the traffic laws.
Online information systems that decide whether a system of person
can be given access to privacy-sensitive data have to comply with
data protection law. Actions of care robots that help sick or elderly
people can damage property or the health of the person (spilling cof-
fee over an iPad, failing to administer medication on time). Intel-
ligent fridges that can order food or drinks when the supplies run
out have to obey contract law. Autonomous robot weapons have to
comply with the of war, with its three principles that soldiers should
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, that an
attack is prohibited if the expected civilian harm is disproportional to
the expected military benefits, and that military force must be neces-
sary to the explicit purpose of defeating an adversary.
When such autonomous systems are being used, legal rules can-
not any more be regarded as regulating human behaviour, since it is
not the humans but the machines who act. This raises the problem of
how the autonomous systems can be designed in such a way that their
behaviour complies with the law. Note that this question needs to be
asked irrespective of the question whether machines can assigned
responsibility in a legal sense. Even if a human remains legally re-
sponsible or liable for the actions of the machine, the human faces
the problem of ensuring that the machine behaves in such a way that
the responsible human complies with the law.
One solution to the problem is to design the system in a way that
guarantees that the system will not exhibit unwanted behaviour. This
is the conventional solution when non-autonomous machines, tools
or systems are used. [16] called this regimentation. A similar ap-
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proach has been proposed for autonomous systems, such as in the
Responsible Intelligent Systems project at Utrecht University, which
proposes to verify the behaviour of systems off-line with so-called
model-checking techniques2. However, when systems are increas-
ingly autonomous, their input and behaviour cannot be fully pre-
dicted, so that regimentation or advance off-line testing are impos-
sible or of limited value. How can we then ensure that autonomous
systems comply with the law? This position paper discusses to what
extent the fruits of AI & law research are relevant for solving this
problem. (For a related discussion from a more legal perspective and
specifically for robots see [18]). To this end, I will first briefly review
the history of AI & law research and then compare the problems
faced by autonomous intelligent systems with the problems faced by
lawyers in traditional legal settings.
2 A brief history of AI & law
The 1970s and 1980s were the heydays of research on knowledge-
based systems, such as the influential MYCIN system for diagnosis
and treatment of infection diseases [6]). For long3 computer scientist
could in these days easily think that in the legal domain knowledge-
based systems can be much easier developed than in the medical
and similar domains. While medical knowledge needs to be acquired
from human medical experts who are not always aware how they
solve a medical problem, legal knowledge would simply be avail-
able as rules in written texts, such as statutes and case law reports.
And such rules can easily be represented in a rule-based system like
MYCIN, after which their application to the facts of a case would be
a simple matter of logic. On this account, once a legal text and a body
of facts have been clearly represented in a logical language, the valid
inferences are determined by the meaning of the representations and
so techniques of automated deduction apply.
However, this mechanical approach leaves out most of what is im-
portant in legal reasoning, as every lawyer knows. To start with, leg-
islators can never fully predict in which circumstances the law has
to be applied, so legislation has to be formulated in general and ab-
stract terms, such as ‘duty of care’, ‘misuse of trade secrets’ or ‘in-
tent’, and qualified with general exception categories, such as ‘self
defence’, ‘force majeure’ or ‘unreasonable’. Such concepts and ex-
ceptions must be interpreted in concrete cases, a process which cre-
ates room for doubt and disagreement. This is reinforced by the fact
that legal cases often involve conflicting interests of opposing par-
ties. The prosecution in a criminal case wants the accused convicted
while the accused wants to be acquitted. The plaintiff in a civil law
2 https://www.projects.science.uu.nl/reins/,
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suit wants to be awarded compensation for damages, while the de-
fendant wants to avoid having to pay. The tax authority in a tax case
wants to receive as much tax as possible, while the taxpayer wants
to pay as little as possible. Both aspects of the law, i.e., the tension
between the general terms of the law and the particulars of a case,
and the adversarial nature of legal procedures, cause legal reasoning
to go beyond the meaning of the legal rules. It involves appeals to
precedent, principle, policy and purpose, as well as the considera-
tion of reasons for and against drawing conclusions. Another prob-
lem is that the law often gives considerable freedom of judgement
to the judge, for example, when determining the extent of financial
compensation for a tort or when determining the sentence in a crim-
inal case. Although judges are supposed to decide like cases alike,
in these matters there are no clear rules, since cases are never fully
alike. In all this, it is relevant that the law is not just a conceptual or
axiomatic system but has social objectives and social effects, which
must be taken into account when applying the law. A final problem
is that determining the facts of a case is often hard, since it requires
vast amounts of commonsense knowledge of the world, and giving
the computer common sense is a recognised hard problem in AI [7].
In sum, law application is not just logically applying statute and
case law rules to the facts of a case but also involves common sense,
empathy and a sense of justice and fairness. Modelling these aspects
in a computer program has so far proved too hard.
However, this does not mean that AI cannot be usefully applied
to the law. Deductive techniques have been practically successful,
especially in the application of knowledge-based systems in large-
scale processing of administrative law, such as social benefit law and
tax law. Such systems apply computational representations of leg-
islation to the facts as interpreted by the human user. The use of
such systems has been proved to greatly reduce two major sources
of errors in the processing of social benefit applications by ‘street-
level bureaucrats’: their incomplete knowledge of the relevant reg-
ulations and their inability to handle the often complex structure of
the regulations, with complex boolean combinations of conditions,
numerical calculations and cross-references [14, 29]. The computer
is, of course, ideally suited for retrieving stored information and for
handling syntactic and numerical complexities. Deductive rule-based
systems have therefore been applied in public administration on a
considerable scale. Such systems leave it to the user (the official
with the authority to make a decision) to decide whether to accept
the system’s recommendation or to deviate from it on non-statutory
grounds. Thus these systems do not automate legal judgement but the
logic of regulations [15, 14].
The deductive model of legal reasoning has been refined with
means to express rule-exception structures and hierarchies of regu-
lations. Two common structural features of legal regulations are the
separation of general rules and exceptions, and the use of hierar-
chies over legislative sources to resolve conflicts between different
regulations. AI and law has dealt with these features with so-called
non-monotonic logics. Such logics have been shown useful in mod-
eling legislative rule-exception structures and legislative hierarchies
[10, 24, 13, 32], and in modeling legal presumptions and notions
of burdens of proof [25, 11, 12]. Nevertheless, although nonmono-
tonic techniques technically deviate from deductive logic, their spirit
is still the same, namely, of deriving consequences from clear and
unambiguous representations of legal rules, rule priorities and facts.
More often, conflicts arise not from competing norms but from the
variety of ways in which they can be interpreted. A real challenge
for deductive accounts of legal reasoning is the gap between the gen-
eral legal language and the particulars of a case. Because of this gap,
disagreement can arise, and it will arise because of the conflicts of
interests between the parties.
These observations can be illustrated with the famous Riggs v.
Palmer case discussed in [9], in which a grandson had killed his
grandfather and then claimed his share in the inheritance. Accord-
ing to the applicable inheritance law, the grandson was entitled to his
share, but every lawyer understands that he killed his grandfather is a
reason not to apply this law. And indeed the court denied the grand-
son his claim on the grounds that nobody should profit from his own
wrongdoing. A deductive or nonmonotonic rule-based system cannot
recognise this, unless the exception is already represented in concrete
terms in the knowledge base. Adding an explicit exception like ‘un-
less the heir would profit from his own wrongdoing by inheriting’ to
the relevant legal rules would not solve the problem, since the system
cannot recognize that inheriting from one’s grandfather after killing
amounts to profiting from one’s wrongdoing, unless this is explicitly
represented in the system’s rule base.
Nevertheless, AI offers more to the law than systems based on
deductive or nonmonotonic logic. To start with, when for an inter-
pretation problem the relevant factors are known, and a large body of
decided cases is available, and these cases are by and large consis-
tently decided, then techniques from machine learning and datamin-
ing can be used to let the computer recognize patterns in the decision
and to use these patterns to predict decisions in new cases. One ex-
ample is [8]’s statistical model for predicting whether a job offered
to an unemployed is ‘suitable employment’, in which case refusal of
the job offer should lead to a reduction of the employment benefit
(see [31] for a neural-network application to the same data and [2]
for a similar application to UK social security law). Another example
is the sentencing system of [20], which could give judges deciding
on sentences for street robberies insight into sentences assigned in
similar past cases. On sentencing see also [28].
In spite of the good level of performance of such AI techniques,
their practical usefulness in the legal domain is limited, for two main
reasons. First, not many legal interpretation problems meet all three
requirements for successful use of these techniques: a known and
stable set of relevant factors, many decided cases, and little noise
among or inconsistency between these cases. More importantly, these
techniques are notoriously bad in explaining their output. They are
essentially black boxes, which give no insight into how they relate
their input to their output. Needless to say that for judges this is a
major obstacle to using these systems.
These limitations are addressed in AI & law research on legal
argument. This research has led to many important theoretical ad-
vances, all based on the idea that legal reasoning is about construct-
ing and critically evaluating arguments for and against alternative
solutions of a case. Detailed models have been provided of the role
of cases, principles, values and purpose in legal reasoning, of analog-
ical reasoning of reasoning about evidence and of the role of proce-
dure and burden of proof in legal reasoning. For overviews see e.g.
[27, 4, 26, 23]. While some of this research has been purely theoret-
ically motivated, others ultimately have practical aims. For instance,
[1] sketched a vision of a system which could support an advocate
charged with preparing a case at short notice. The system would be
able to accept the facts of the case and then generate arguments for
the two sides to the case and counterarguments to them, together with
the precedents on which they are based. However, such a system is
not yet in practical use at any law firm. A main problem with AI
& law’s proof-of-concept systems has so far that they are critically
dependent on the possibility of acquiring a large amount of knowl-
edge and representing it in a form which can be manipulated by the
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system. This is an instance of the well known ‘knowledge acquisi-
tion bottleneck’, which has proved a major barrier to the practical
exploitation of intelligent techniques in many domains.
The most recent development in AI & law research is a revital-
isation of research on information retrieval by the recent spectacu-
lar developments in such areas as deep learning, data science, and
natural-language processing, combined with the availability of huge
amounts of unstructured legal information on the internet. This has
put new topics such as information integration, text mining and ar-
gument mining on the research agenda. With IBM’s Watson system
available, the holy grail for many in legal informatics is not an argu-
mentation assistant as described in [1] but a legal research assistant
in the form of an application of Watson, which can efficiently find,
summarise and integrate information relevant to a case.
Nevertheless, there is some hope that this recent research can also
make an argumentation assistant within research. A very recent ap-
plication of text mining called ‘argument mining’ has become pop-
ular [21, 33, 17] and IBM’s Watson team has already experimented
with a ‘debater’ function, which can find arguments for and against a
given claim. The fruits of this research can perhaps be combined with
AI & law’s argumentation models in such a way that these models
can finally be scaled up to realistic size, without the need for formal
knowledge representation.
3 Is obeying the law always desirable?
Before discussing how autonomous systems can be made to obey the
law, first another question must be discussed: it it always desirable
to obey the law? In part this is still a legal question, since (parts of)
legal systems have general exception categories like the exception
concerning self-defence and other ones in criminal law, a general
exception in Dutch civil law that statutory rules concerning creditor-
debt relations shall not be applied if such application is unreasonable,
and so on. Consider the case of the autonomously driving Google car,
which was stopped by the California police for driving too slowly.
Google had for safety reasons set the car’s maximum speed for roads
in a 35mph zone at 25mph and one of its cars was causing a big queue
of traffic while driving 24mph.4 From a technical legal point of view
this is not a case of undesirable norm obedience, since the relevant
traffic regulation contains the following general exception clause:
No person shall drive upon a highway at such a slow speed
as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of
traffic, unless the reduced speed is necessary for safe operation,
because of a grade, or in compliance with law.
However, there is still a practical problem, since general excep-
tion clauses like these introduce vagueness and uncertainty. Human
drivers are generally good at determining when their speed is to slow
by applying their experience and common sense. However, can au-
tonomous cars be given the same kind of common sense? For a pre-
liminary proposal see [19].
One step further are cases in which behaviour is from a technical
legal point of view illegal but still socially acceptable. For example,
slightly speeding in a queue of cars that all drive a few miles above
the maximum speed; waiting for a red pedestrian crossing light at
night with no traffic within eyesight; admitting a student to a univer-
sity course who missed the strict admission deadline for some stupid
4 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34808105,
accessed 2 June 2016.
reason. Here the reasoning problem is logically the same as with gen-
eral exception clauses: determining whether particular behaviour sat-
isfies some general exception category to a behavioural rule. That the
exception is now for social instead of legal acceptability is irrelevant
for the kind of reasoning involved.
This all means that the behaviour of autonomous systems should
not be seen as rule-governed but as rule-guided. Legal rules are
just one factor influencing socially optimal or permissible behaviour.
Other factors are e.g. social conventions, individual or social goals or
simply common sense. And sometimes these other factors override
the legal factors. There has been some research on such norm-guided
behaviour in the NORMAS community of International Workshops
on Normative Multi-Agent Systems.5 See, for instance, [5].
4 The classic AI & law problems vs. the new
challenge
For several reasons the above story about the practical applicability
of AI & law research does not automatically apply to the problem of
making autonomous systems obey the law. First, as we saw above, AI
& law research has traditionally focused on support tools for humans
carrying out legal tasks. With autonomous systems this is different:
they do not support humans in their legal tasks (although they may
support humans in other tasks) but they have to decide about the legal
status of their own actions. In many cases it will be impossible for
humans to check or override the system’s decision.
Moreover, the tasks supported by traditional AI often concern the
application of the law to past cases, to determine whether some past
behaviour or some existing state of affairs is lawful or induces legal
consequences. With autonomous systems this is different, since they
have to think about the legal status of their future actions. Among
other things, this means that in contrast to in traditional legal settings,
autonomous systems do not face evidential problems in the legal
sense. Even when traditional AI & law supports legal tasks with an
eye to the future, such as deciding on benefit or permit applications,
drafting regulations or contracts or designing tax constructions, there
are differences with autonomous systems. While traditionally sup-
ported future-oriented task concern behaviour in the non-immediate
future and often contain classes of actions (as with contract or with
regulation design), autonomous systems have to ‘run-time’ consider
individual actions in the immediate future.
Another difference, as explained in Section 3, is that the tasks sup-
ported by traditional AI & law are usually strictly legal while au-
tonomous systems have to balance legal considerations against other
considerations. This is not a black-and-white difference since, as ex-
plained in Section 2, law application also involves considering the so-
cial context and issues of fairness, common sense and the like. How-
ever, in the law, this is always done in service to the overall problem
of classifying behaviour into legal categories. With autonomous sys-
tems this is different, since they do not have as their sole or primary
aim to stay within the law.
Yet another difference is that the legal tasks supported by tradi-
tional AI & law tools require explanation and justification of deci-
sions. With autonomous systems there is no need for this; all that
counts is that legally acceptable behaviour is generated. Of course,
when an autonomous system does something legally wrong, its be-
haviour might have to be explained in a court case. However, this
does not require that the system itself can do that; it may suffice to
have a log file recording the system’s internal actions.
5 http://icr.uni.lu/normas/, accessed 30 May 2016.
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Finally, one may expect that the bulk of the cases encountered by
an autonomous system will from a legal point of view be standard,
mundane cases. For example, autonomous cars will not have to deter-
mine the legal responsibility for car accidents but will have to decide
about driving from A to B in a way that respects the traffic regula-
tions. While processing legislation in public administration also usu-
ally concerns standard cases, in the court room this is different.
5 Implications for applicability of AI & law
research
What are the implications of the similarities and differences between
the ‘traditional’ and new settings for the applicability of AI & Law
research? The discussion here has to be speculative, since the answer
depends on the type of autonomous system, how advanced it is, how
safety-critical it is, and so on. Moreover, presently, there are still only
few autonomous systems in practical use that have to take legally rel-
evant decisions in a non-trivial way. Nevertheless, the technological
developments go fast. Just 10 years ago, recent advances like IBM’s
Watson system and autonomously driving vehicles seemed unthink-
able for the near future. Therefore, thinking about these issues cannot
be postponed to the future.
Essentially, there have so far been three kinds of successful AI &
law applications: decision support for large volumes of routine deci-
sion tasks (as in public administration); retrieval, summary and inte-
gration of legal information; and prediction of outcomes of decision
problems in narrowly-defined factor-based domains.
Does the ‘standard’ nature of many cases faced by autonomous
systems mean that the techniques for routine decision support as used
in public administration can be applied to autonomous systems? This
is not likely, since the traditional rule-based systems crucially rely
on humans for preprocesses the input facts in legal terms and for
overriding if necessary the system’s decisions.
Can Watson-like legal research agents that retrieve, summarise
and integrate information support autonomous systems? Here a sim-
ilar problem arises, since the effective use of retrieved, summarised
and integrated information still crucially relies on human judgement.
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the currently available le-
gal information will be useful for the mundane and future-oriented
normative decision problems faced by autonomous systems.
Are nonmonotonic reasoning techniques useful as a way to deal
with exceptions and conflicting regulations? Not really, since such
techniques do not offer ways to recognise the need for an exception
to a legal rule or to recognize the best way to resolve a conflict be-
tween regulations, unless this has been programmed into the system
in specific terms. Moreover, if the rules contain general exception
clauses or the regulations contain general conflict resolution princi-
ples, the classification and interpretation problem will be too big.
Can machine-learning techniques as applied to factor-based do-
mains support autonomous systems in classification and interpreta-
tion problems? Perhaps to some extent but there is room for caution
here, since in the law these techniques have so far only worked for
narrowly defined domains with a large amount of relatively consis-
tent data. And the law does not have many of such domains. More-
over, when the data has to come from case law, a problem is that the
cases may not be standard future-oriented cases of the kinds faced by
the autonomous system. On the other hand, the ‘traditional’ draw-
back that these systems cannot justify or explain their output does
not apply for autonomous systems, which are only meant to generate
legally correct behaviour, not to explain or justify it.
Finally, there is the question whether an autonomous system
should be designed to reason about how to behave lawfully or
whether it can be trained to do so with machine-learning techniques
applied to a large number of training cases. In the first approach there
is the need for explicit representation of legal information in the sys-
tem and for giving the system explicit reasoning and decision making
capabilities. This is still somewhat similar to the traditional AI & law
systems for supporting human decision making, except that the hu-
man is taken out of the loop. An important issue then is whether the
mundane nature of cases faced by the autonomous system can re-
duce the complexity of the classification and interpretation problems
to such an extent that the machine can fully take over. On the other
hand, the reasoning can, unlike in the traditional settings, be opaque
in that there is no need for explaining or justifying why the behaviour
is legally correct. Incidentally, the latter combined with the run-time
and forward-oriented setting with mundane cases, makes that the cur-
rent research strands on evidential legal reasoning and sophisticated
legal argument will likely be less relevant here.
The other approach is that the ability to behave legally correctly is
acquired implicitly by training. For very advanced autonomous sys-
tems, like robots operating in daily life, this might be equivalent to
solving the notorious AI common-sense problem, but for more mod-
est systems this approach might do. One interesting question is how
autonomous vehicles classify on this scale. [18] discuss some inter-
pretation and classification problems in Dutch traffic law that are rel-
atively easy for humans but seem very hard for the current generation
of autonomous vehicles. The ‘training’ approach does not necessar-
ily avoid the need for explicit representation of legal rules and reg-
ulations. They must now be represented as part of the design spec-
ification. One issue here is whether these specifications should be
machine-processable in the same way as when designing explicit le-
gal reasoners (as in the methods proposed by [3, 30]). It seems likely
that at least some form of semi-formal representation is required, for
purposes of verification and maintainability.
6 Conclusion
This position paper has been motivated by the rapidly increasing
prospects of practically used autonomous artificial systems perform-
ing legally relevant tasks. The aim was to discuss how the current
fruits of AI & law research on supporting human legal decision mak-
ing can be used for making autonomous artificial systems behave
lawfully. To this end the problems faced by human lawyers were
compared to those faced by autonomous systems. The main simi-
larity is that in both cases there is automated application of norms
to facts. However, main differences are that the legal problems faced
by autonomous systems have to be solved run-time and are future-
instead of past-oriented. Moreover, while in traditional legal settings
being lawful is the main goal, for autonomous systems it is only one
of the concerns, to be balanced against, for example, social and in-
dividual goals. On the other hand, the legal problems faced by au-
tonomous systems are, unlike those faced by lawyers in traditional
settings, usually standard, mundane cases. Moreover, unlike lawyers
in traditional settings, autonomous systems will usually not have to
explain why their behaviour is lawful.
Because of the similarities, research on designing legally well-
behaving autonomous systems can profit from the fruits of current
AI & law research. However, because of the differences, applying
these fruits in the new contexts is not trivial and requires extensive
further research. In this position paper I have tried to create some
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